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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ISLAND-HOPPING TOWARD JUSTICE.
For seven decades the Illinois courts appear to have been engaged in a
somewhat protracted judicial island-hopping campaign' with the objective
of reaching a comprehensive and just solution for legal problems involving
rights of contribution and indemnification between so-called joint tort-
feasors.2 Since the initial assaults, a number of limited successes have been
achieved but the ultimate objective still appears to remain over the horizon
within the large area encompassed by the "no contribution" rule first an-
nounced by Lord Kenyon in the case of Merryweather v. Nixan.8
Despite its age, the Merryweather holding is quite unworthy of the
veneration it has received. Hasty judicial consideration, the absence of any
real reason to support the "no contribution" rule, and the unfairness at-
tendant upon its wide application, make the acceptance originally accorded
the decision, not only in Illinois but in most other jurisdictions, a matter
difficult to understand. Yet it was widely accepted and was broadly in-
terpreted to the point where one Illinois justice could say the holding was
"unquestionable law. "4 For present purposes, it will suffice to remember
that the situation so presented is not one entirely unique in law5 and to
note that the unjust potentialities inherent in the "no contribution" rule
'The campaign appears to have been begun in 1881, when the now obsolete case
of Goldsborough v. Darst, 9 Ill. App. 205 (1881), was decided.
2 As used herein, the phrase "joint tortfeasors" means those persons who may
be joined as defendants under the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 148. Although some nice objections might be raised to this terminology, its cur-
rent convenient use, subject to the distinction hereinafter noted between tort-
feasors who happen merely to be jointly liable and those who are guilty of con-
spiracy or concerted intentional wrongdoing, would seem to justify repetition of
the phrase as so defined.
3 8 Term. R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). To refresh recollection, it might be
noted that the Messrs. Merryweather and Nixan had there been found guilty as
trespassers and converters at the suit of one Starkey. Unfortunately for Merry-
weather, he was so circumstanced that victim Starkey was able to obtain from him
alone satisfaction in full of a substantial judgment which had been entered against
both tortfeasors. While Nixan may have sustained a slightly blemished reputation
from the decision, the contents of his pocketbook were not in any way impaired.
To redress this patently unjust situation, Merryweather then sued Nixan in gen-
eral assumpsit but was nonsuited at the assizes and, in the King's Bench, Lord
Kenyon refused a rule to set aside the nonsuit. His Lordship said he had never
heard of such an action where the former recovery had been based on a tort and,
save for the vague suggestion that the rule should not extend to deny an em-
ployee's right to Indemnity in some situations, that was that.
4 Chief Justice Scates, in Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 at 449 (1856).
5 Consider, for example, the development of the doctrine with regard to contribu-
tory negligence as noted in Turk, "Comparative Negligence of the March," 28
CHIoAGO-KENT LAW REv Iw 189-245 (1950), particularly pp. 190-1 and 197-9.
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were eventually and necessarily discerned. Since then, Illinois courts, fol-
lowing an island-hopping strategy from one to another of a lengthening
series of exceptions to the rule, have progressed toward the mitigation of
some of its harsh consequences.
Actually, progress has been made along two different avenues of ad-
vance. Many decisions have applied the "no contribution" rule to what
may properly be termed contribution in contrast to indemnity cases with
little differentiation. Although contribution and indemnification are closely
akin, the distinction between them deserves notice, for it marks a division
of considerable practical importance. The attitude of the Illinois courts
has long been characterized by a reluctance to apportion ultimate legal
responsibility among several joint tortfeasors for harm done by them so,
where the entire burden could be shifted completely by way of indemnity,
thereby making apportionment unnecessary, important gains have been
registered against the unjust aspects of the rule. On the other hand, where
the attempt has been made to distribute the ultimate burden by way of
contribution, so that all joint tortfeasors involved would carry some part
of it, successes have been slight and slow of realization.
Two Illinois Appellate Court decisions describe clearly the present line
of contact, in the indemnity sector, between the island-hopping forces of
law revision and the entrenched "no contribution" rule. These are the cases
of Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Com-
pany6 and Palmer House Company v. Otto,7 which decisions, not only be-
cause they were handed down in recent years but for the more substantial
reason that they reflect progressive judicial attitudes, should be safe for a
while from being relegated to a position of mere historical interest. In the
first of these cases, the plaintiff railroad sought to recover an amount of
compensation which it had been forced to pay to an injured employee,8
alleging that the primary cause of the employee's injury had been the dan-
gerous manner in which the defendant's truck had been parked. The busi-
ness contract between plaintiff and defendant did not include any sort of
hold-harmless clause and the plaintiff had promptly notified defendant of
the fact of injury and the surrounding circumstances, but the trial court
nevertheless granted a motion by defendant to strike the complaint. The
Appellate Court for the First District, on the other hand, reversed and
remanded. When so doing, the court could have bottomed its decision on a
number of earlier Illinois cases with analogous fact situations, but the scope
of the rule of law which it announced could gain support only from an in-
secure dictum from one earlier Illinois case, which reflected a more enlight-
6343 Il. App. 148, 98 N. E. (2d) 783 (1951).
7 347 Ill. App. 198, 106 N. E. (2d) 753 (1952).
8 The employee's claim against the employer had been based on the Federal Em-
-loyer's Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq.
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ened approach already taken in other jurisdictions. Without the full and
comforting support afforded by ample precedent, the court chose to disre-
gard the contractual relationship between the railroad and the trucker and
declined to relate its rule of law to such relationship,9 preferring to state,
instead, that the "vast growth of negligence law has markedly changed the
characteristics of negligence actions. Legal negligence no longer embodies
a concept of misbehavior just short of the criminal or the immoral. The
courts have, therefore, had to find a way to do justice within the law so
that one guilty of an act of negligence-affirmative, active, primary in
character-will not escape scot free. ' 1°
The second case, that of Palmer House CUompany v. Otto," decided a
year later, involved the right of plaintiff hotel to indemnification for the
amount of a judgment it had paid to one of its former guests who had
been injured in the course of a negligently conducted furniture moving
operation carried on by the defendant, an independent contractor. The
guest had sued the hotel only but the latter had seasonably notified the
mover with respect to the situation. Hotel and mover were contractually
related, so one noteworthy aspect of the fact situation was not novel and
the appellate court's reversal and remandment of a trial court judgment
for defendant might be thought to have followed, as a matter of course, in
the train of many earlier decisions. The case can, however, be regarded as a
significant advancement of the indemnification doctrine for in it there oc-
curred a judicial comparison, or balancing, of respective duties, and of the
character of the breaches thereof, imposed on each of the tortfeasors solely
by force of the common law. Prior thereto, the Illinois courts had closely
associated the less reprehensible secondary negligence, which had to be shown
by a successful indemnitee, with a legal duty created by or resulting from
a statute, an ordinance, or the respondeat superior doctrine, so that, if both
tortfeasors had breached ordinary, non-vicarious common law duties, they
were said to stand in pari delicto and indemnity could not be awarded.
Now, under the Palmer House case, there appears to be developing a
salutary judicial willingness to disregard artificial or arbitrary distinctions
based upon the nature or source of duties owed by the would-be indemnitee
and his intended indemnitor to the injured third party.12
Consideration of the indemnity decisions should properly begin with
the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Griffith v. Na-
9 Previously, contractual privity had been looked upon as an essential foundation
for an implied in law promise to indemnify.
10 343 Ill. App. 148 at 156, 98 N. E. (2d) 783 at 787.
11347 Ill. App. 198, 106 N. E. (2d) 758 (1952).
12 The case also points up the detail that the indemnitee's recovery can be made
to include attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in resisting the claim of
the injured person.
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tional Fireproofing Company.13 The effect of this case may honestly be said
to be comparable to the result which would obtain if the firing of a .30
caliber bullet should be accompanied by the report of a sixteen-inch gun.
The case needed only to decide whether an express hold-harmless agree-
ment given by defendant sub-contractor to the plaintiff general contractor,
intended to secure the latter against a statute-imposed duty to third per-
sons, was void for contravention of public policy. For the same reasons
which apply with respect to liability insurance policies, the agreement was
held valid. But Mr. Justice Dunn was not content to limit his opinion to
the confines of that narrow issue. Basing his dictum on a manifestation of
that familiar phenomenon in American jurisprudence known as the "Massa-
chusetts rule," '14 he sweepingly opined that the law should inquire into
the real delinquency between joint tortfeasors and place liability on the
one whose fault was the real cause of the injury. Plainly, the principle
thus stated was straightforward, simple, and just, but it was also plainly
antithetical to the then long-favored Merryweather doctrine. For announc-
ing this principle, and thereby making possible the two holdings afore-
mentioned, the judge deserves commendation. Nevertheless, the comment
may fairly be made that the precise and curious coincidence of previous
dictum and of subsequent fact situation which characterized the long
chronological link between these cases is hardly something to be relied
upon as a system to foster sound legal progress.
To complete the review of the indemnity area, four other cases merit
mention and a deferential nod should be given to what is now an obsolete
rule of law.1 5 Perhaps it would be more profitable, before merely reciting
the names of these cases, to recount the analysis made of them for they dis-
close significant factual similarities. First, the wrongs to the injured
persons were caused negligently and not by intention. Second, all were
law actions between private litigants. Third, in each, some sort of express
contract, not however including an indemnity or hold-harmless agreement,
existed between the plaintiff-indemnitee and the defendant-indemnitor at
the time the relevant tort liability was incurred. Fourth, in each, the in-
1s 310 Ill. 331, 141 N. H. 739, 38 A. L. R. 559 (1923).
14 See Gray v. Boston Gaslight Co., 114 Mass. 149 (1873).
15 Although the general subject of workmen's compensation is beyond the scope
of this paper, it should be noted that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Ch. 48, § 138.5, purported
to confer upon the employer the right to recover from the party whose conduct had
proximately caused the injury for the amount paid out for compensation. This sec-
tion was held unconstitutional in Grasse v. Dealers Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106
N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), noted in 30 CmHCAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 375, on the basis
it derogated against the employee's common-law right of action against the third
person. The statute was amended, in 1953, so as to purport to save to the em-
ployer a right to reimbursement: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
The case of Hyland v. 79 West Monroe Corp., 2 Ill. App. (2d) 83, 118 N. U. (2d)
636 (1954), however, would tend to indicate that employer may experience pro-
cedural difficulties in establishing his claim.
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demnitee had promptly communicated the circumstances to the indemnitor.
In two of the cases, those entitled Chicago Railways Company v. Conway
i s
and Pennsylvania Company v. Roberts and Schaefer,"7 the indemnitees had
been held liable because of the presence of a statutory provision. In the
other two, being the cases of Purple Swan Safety Coach Company v. Egyp-
tian Transportation Company's and Skala v. Lehon,19 liability attached to
the indemnitee by reason of applications made of the respondeat superior
doctrine.
All four cases acknowledged the existence of the "no contribution"
rule, but each was decided favorably to the indemnitee because of excep-
tions to that rule. In one instance, the court recognized an exception in those
cases where the indemnitee's conduct was no more than malum prohi-
bitum.20 In another, the court declined to apply the "no contribution" rule
against an employer, held liable to his injured employee only because of
their relationship, who was not in pari delicto with the builder of the de-
fective machine. 21 A third case avoided the rule by finding that the in-
demnitee-agent, an originating bus line, and the indemnitor-principal, a
connecting carrier, were not joint tortfeasors.2 2 The last of the cases,
somewhat more boldly, suggested that, as between indemnitee-employer
and indemnitor-employee, the "no contribution" rule would be inappro-
priate where there had been no concerted action between the tortfeasors. 23
Beside these exceptions stands the old, and now practically obsolete,
one which allows a municipality to secure indemnity from an abutting
property owner or contractor whose conduct has caused a third person,
using a public way, to sustain an injury, provided the latter has recovered
therefor from the municipality.24  Obviously, protection for the public
treasury is a matter of far greater consequence, and quite unrelated to,
the questionable end sought to be served by the "no contribution" rule.
This line of cases needs no developing as the point retains little more than
possible historical interest for the problem has now generally been obviated
by municipal requirements with regard to express indemnification, with
16 219 Ill. App. 220 (1920).
17250 Ill. App. 330 (1928). The employee's injury for which plaintiff sought in-
demnity had occurred in Pennsylvania, so the Illinois workmen's compensation stat-
ute was not applicable.
is 256 Ill. App. 442 (1930).
19 343 Ill. 602, 175 N. E. 832 (1931).
20 Chicago Railways Co. v. Conway, 219 Ill. App. 220 (1920).
21 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roberts and Schaefer, 250 Ill. App. 330 (1928).
22 Purple Swan Safety Coach Co. v. Egyptian Trans. Co., 256 Ill. App. 442 (1930).
It might be noted that the decision was achieved prior to the adoption of the present
Civil Practice Act.
28 Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N. E. 832 (1931).
24 See City of Canton v. Torrence, 151 Ill. App. 129 (1909), for an illustration of
this view.
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sufficient sureties, before work from which a liability could arise may be
undertaken.25
A capsule statement of the indemnification principle, as presently ap-
plicable in Illinois, might then well read like this: The law will inquire into
the relative delinquencies of persons joint liable for non-intentional tortious
conduct and by means of a quasi-contractual remedy will ultimately place
the full responsibility upon the one of them to whom the more serious
delinquency attaches. To bring himself within the scope of this general
principle, the successful indemnitee is obliged to comply with one condi-
tion precedent. He must promptly inform his intended indemnitor of the
fact that the injured person claims redress in order that the indemnitor
may be afforded a fair opportunity to assert any available defenses against
the injured person.26 Further, while such circumstances may no longer be
considered crucial, the would-be indemnitee can be better assured of success
if it can be shown that he was in privity with his intended indemnitor and
that his liability to the injured person resulted either vicariously or else
involved no more than the breach of some minor statutory provision.
Further extensions or modifications of the indemnification principle
may yet be made but credit is certainly due to the judges and lawyers who
have developed it to its present state. Unfortunately, their successful con-
structive work in the indemnity area has not been accompanied by any like
degree of success in the companion field of contribution. Against the Mer-
ryweather doctrine, as applied with respect to distribution of responsibility
in tort situations, the law revision forces established a small beachhead
some sixty-five years ago but have been bogged down therein ever since.
This stalemate is understandable for, while the same social policies favor
both liberalized indemnification and a less strict rule of contribution, the
more formidable legal obstacles have been, and continue to be, present in
the contribution sector. Any attempted assertion of a right of contribution
would entail a frontal assault on the "no contribution" rule whereas it
has been possible to advance the indemnity principle, because of Lord
Kenyon's hinted exception, around the flank under less arduous conditions.
Direct advocacy of a scheme for the distribution of responsibility among
joint tortfeasors would seem suspiciously like support for the idea of
comparative negligence, a concept running counter to a traditional fond-
ness on the part of Illinois judges for the contributory negligence doc-
trine.27 Other complicating factors may be noticed in the lack of an ade-
25 Mun. Code of Chicago, § 33--47, requiring a bond for sidewalk repair work, is
typical.
26 See City of Chicago v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 186 Il. 300, 57 N. E. 795 (1900).
27 In general, see Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution In Negligence Actions
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1936), pp. 49-50.
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quate system for third-party practice and some confusion with respect to
the proper offices of releases and covenants not to sue.
The beachhead aforementioned was auspiciously established, in 1889,
through the case of Farwell v. Baker.2s The plaintiff there, in an equity
action, had been awarded a decree ordering that contribution be made
by the defendants toward the amount of a judgment which plaintiff had
satisfied. Both plaintiff and defendants had been creditors of a finan-
cially-straitened Iowa merchant and, independently of each other, had
caused a stock of goods, thought by them to belong to the merchant, to
be attached. Actually, title to the goods was elsewhere so the purported
attachment turned out to be a conversion. At the time it affirmed a trial
court decree for contribution proportionate to the indebtedness owed by
the Iowa merchant to each of the parties, the Illinois Supreme Court se-
lected a direct quotation from the English ease of Adamson v. Jarvis"'
which unsurprisingly enough, had revealed some of the restrictions which
were later imposed on the "no contribution" rule in the jurisdiction of
its origin.30 Under the holding in the Farwell case, the necessary ele-
ments for a successful contribution action then appeared to be: (1) the
plaintiff's good faith and ordinary prudence; (2) notice to his fellow
joint tortfeasors; (3) an equitable arrangement to determine the amounts
to be contributed by them; and (4) the pursuit of an objective common
to the parties from which their common liability had resulted.
Little notice of the indicated concept appears to have been taken since
then 1 except for the fact that the fairly recent case of Aldridge v. Morris
s2
a wrongful death action, appears to have indirectly considered the "no
contribution" rule. In that case, the reviewing court, when affirming a
trial court judgment for defendant on other grounds, made a passing
observation to the effect that, with respect to the matter of damages, the
principle limiting an injured person to one full recovery would operate
to override any interpretation of the "no contribution" rule which would
28 129 Ill. 261, 21 N. E. 792, 6 L. R. A. 400 (1889).
29 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (1827). The Illinois court erroneously referred
to the case as being entitled Adamson v. Bidgood.
so In particular, the English court restricted the "no contribution" rule to those
situations where the person seeking contribution could be said to know, or at least
be presumed to have known, that he was engaged in an unlawful act.
31 The decision in the Farwell case was followed, six years later, in Selz, Schwab
& Co. v. Gunthman, 62 Ill. App. 624 (1895), but that case, because of its identical
fact situation, added little to the law. There is dictum in Wallach v. Billings,
195 Ill. App. 605 (1916), to the effect that one of a number of misfeasantly acting
bank directors would have a right of contribution against his fellows for money
paid to cover losses incurred through their mismanagement. The point would now
seem to be covered by an express statutory provision: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1,
Ch. 32, § 157.42.
32 337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949).
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deny a defendant the right to introduce evidence that some compensation,
in return for a covenant not to sue for the injury, had been received from
another person whose negligence had concurred in the injury, provided he
was one whom the plaintiff might have joined in the action. Although
that case, and those like it, should settle forever the two conflicting lines
of earlier cases dealing with the admissibility of evidence regarding
amounts paid for such covenants,83 the unrefined, extra-judicial sort of
contribution there countenanced cannot be said to really represent progress
in the matter. As no relevant cases in the field of partnership have been
found,3 4 it can only be said that the Illinois common law on the subject
of contribution appears to be confined within the perimeter fixed by the
Farwell case.
This suspended development of the rule laid down in the Farwell
case would tend to leave even the most optimistic lawyer uncertain as
to the current state of the law but the query raises itself as to whether
there is any justification for delaying the elimination of that uncertainty.
The present validity of each of the three so-called reasons usually assigned
in support of the "no contribution" rule would appear to be open to suc-
cessful challenge, except possibly in those situations where the joint tort-
feasors have conspired or acted in concert to cause intentional harm. It
has been urged, as a primary reason, that the joint tortfeasor who is fully
responsible for the harm done should bear a penal burden to discourage
further wrongdoing, hence should not be rewarded with a right of con-
tribution. The artificiality and futility of this reason is disclosed by brief
reflection for, if only one of a number of joint tortfeasors discharges the
joint responsibility, his fellows escape any penalty, are not discouraged,
and may even be rewarded.
For a second reason, it has been suggested that courts should not
clog their dockets with controversies between wrongdoers, thereby delay-
ing the administration of justice to other litigants, approximately half of
whom, presumably, are innocent of any wrongdoing. This reason, too, is
seen to be unrealistic when one remembers that, nowadays, the estab-
lishment of tort liability seldom signifies opprobrium. Once the injured
person has received full redress, there is no sensible reason why the law
should stop short and leave outstanding rights and equities unadjusted.
It has also been said, as a third reason, that courts lack facilities to deter-
as See New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. American Transit Lines, Inc.,
408 11. 338, 97 N. E. (2d) 264 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KMqT LAW REVI W 360.
See also note in 27 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 313. The opposite, and now super-
seded, rule may be noted in Herberger v. Anderson, 268 Ill. App. 403 (1932).
34 Section 18 of the Uniform Partnership Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch.
106J, § 18, appears to be designed to create a right of contribution in favor of a
partner who has been held as a joint tortfeasor.
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mine the respective amounts to be contributed. Mere difficulty should not
be a shield to protect injustice but is not this difficulty more imaginary
than real? The complications that might attend upon the adoption of a
full-scale comparative negligence doctrine could be avoided under a sys-
tem of simple pro-rata contribution such as is employed among joint debtors,
sureties, and the like.
There can, then, be little argument left to oppose the suggestion that
the "no contribution" rule should be abrogated. The means to accomp-
lish this abrogation, and for the simultaneous substitution of a certain,
comprehensive, and just set of rules, may be found in the form of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, first proposed in 1939. Ex-
amination of this statute in detail is not feasible here, but its four prin-
cipal features may be summarized. A right of contribution for damages
paid is there said to exist between all persons who could be proceeded
against jointly in tort. The amount of contribution to be made is there
determined on a pro-rata basis, i. e., equal contribution unless, under spe-
cial circumstances, some other arrangement could be deemed to be more
appropriate. For the prompt adjudication of rights between the joint
tortfeasors, a form of third-party practice is provided. Finally, the statute
leaves undisturbed any right to indemnification which the courts might have
recognized in the past or might recognize in the future. By this feature,
any objection that the statute might unduly favor intentional tortfeasors
has been obviated. 35
An Illinois version of this statute was proposed, under the auspices of
the Chicago Bar Association, to the Sixty-sixth General Assembly in 1949.
Perhaps that first year in former-Governor Stevenson's administration was
not the most opportune time, the legislative hoppers then being well filled
with all kinds of proposed legislation. Whatever the reason, the proposal
was not acted upon and it ended up by being tabled by the House Com-
mittee on Judiciary at the end of the session. 6 In military operations
and in the more prosaic enterprise of law revision, the island-hopping
technique can reach a stage of diminishing returns. When unnecessary
expense, undue delay, and needless uncertainty cause this stage to be
reached, a change in strategy is in order. Now would seem to be the time
for such a change, one from island-hopping to direct legislative assault.
Notwithstanding the unfortunate prior experience, the ease and efficiency
with which the ultimate objective could be gained makes another attempt,
35 The text thereof is set forth in 9 U. L. A. 156 et seq. The proposal appears
to stem from suggestions made in Bohlen, "Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors," 21 Cornell L. Q. 559 (1935) and 22 Cornell L. Q. 469 (1936). A table
showing the list of adoptions appears in 9 U. L. A. 153 and 1953 Supp., 9 U. L. A. 33.
36 The fate of H. B. 175, 66th Gen. Assembly, was briefly noted in 30 Chicago Bar
Rec. 394 (June, 1949).
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free from extraneous considerations,8 7 well worth while. Justice should
be at least as well served in the Prairie State as elsewhere. To that end,
the next General Assembly could perform valuable service if it would con-
sider favorably the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
-feasors Act or some non-complicated variation thereof.
W. C. RAMM
TRUST ADMINISTRATION UPON TERMINATION
The duties and powers of a trustee upon termination of a trust, with
respect to both the real and personal property which forms the trust res,
are not so cut and dried that the trustee can simply pick up his state
statute book or a treatise on the subject and expect to put his finger on
the solution for each precise problem involved in winding up the trust
administration. Indeed, with regard to some of the problems which may
arise, there may in fact turn out to be no authority at all; a conflict of
authority; or, at best, a paucity of authority. But the problems will be
there and will have to be solved so it is a matter of some comfort to know
that, as a general rule, the trustee is not ipso facto deprived of all his
power and authority upon the termination of the trust, hence he-may con-
tinue to exercise such powers and perform such duties as are appropriate
for the winding up of the trust and of his administration thereof.1
Two cases, one arising from a trust under a will and the other resting
on a land trust agreement, serve to illustrate the point. In the first, a
New York case entitled In re Jones' Will,2 the successor trustee of a ter-
minated testamentary trust sought construction of a provision of the de-
cedent's will which purported to confer a power of sale upon the trustee.
At the same time, the trustee also sought to enjoin the remaindermen from
interfering with the trustee's management, operation, and control of the
trust property and to secure an accounting for certain moneys received
by one of the remaindermen. The trust, created over thirty years ago,
had been declared by the testatrix to run for the lives of two designated
persons. Upon the death of the survivor of these two persons, certain
87 The prior proposal may have been complicated by the submission of another
measure having to do with comparative negligence. While a relationship exists be-
tween these two subject matters, each should be considered Independently of the
other and the merits of the one should not be tested by the merits, or demerits, of
the other.
1 General statements to that effect may be found In Beeler v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 293 Ky. 361, 169 S. W. (2d) 16 (1943) ; McBride v. McBride, 262 Ky. 452,
90 S. W. (2d) 736 (1936) ; Christine v. Baldwin, 95 N. J. Eq. 83, 122 A. 369 (1923);
and McNeal v. Hauser, 202 Okla. 329, 213 P. (2d) 559 (1949).
2- N. Y. -, 117 N. E. (2d) 250 (1954), affirming 281 App. Dlv. 900, 120 N. Y. S.
(2d) 25 (1953), but reversing 281 App. Div. 900, 120 N. Y. S. (2d) 519 (1953).
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realty which had composed the corpus of the trust remained unsold and,
shortly thereafter, the defendant-remainderman had entered thereon and,
over protest, had begun collecting the rental income. The trustee con-
tended that the power of sale given by the will survived the termination
of the trust and that he had the exclusive right to control the trust prop-
erty pending a final accounting. A decree of the surrogate court con-
strued the will provision so as to give the trustee an unlimited power of
sale and also restrained the defendant from interfering with the trust
property. This decree was affirmed by the Appellate Division but, upon
further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals, while accepting the con-
struction so given, reversed the restraining order on the ground that the
trustee had no right, after the trust termination, to perform any adminis-
trative act concerning the realty, other than to exercise the power of sale,
for the reason that the title to the realty, in all other respects, had vested
in the remaindermen.
The second case, one arising in Illinois and entitled Breen v. Breen,3
required interpretation of a provision commonly found in land trust agree-
ments in use in this area. By the terms of the agreement, the trust was to
terminate not later than twenty years from the date of creation, at which
time the trustee was to sell any realty which remained in the trust and
was to distribute the proceeds among the beneficiaries. After more than
twenty years had expired, partition proceedings were instituted between
the beneficiaries on the theory that the trustee's powers had ceased and
the interests of the several beneficiaries, clearly designated as being no
more than personalty during the twenty-year period, had thereby become
at least the equivalent of equitable interests in the land, hence were suffi-
cient to support a partition suit.4 The Illinois Supreme Court, acting to
settle the issue, 5 rejected this theory on the ground the trustee, despite the
expiration of the time period, still had a reasonable time within which to
sell the realty and to make distribution of the proceeds.
These cases would indicate that, regardless where title to the trust
corpus may be upon termination of the trust,6 doctrines of practical
necessity may compel a continuation of the trust powers beyond normal
limits. Some cases, in fact, have gone to the extent of holding that a trust
does not become fully executed, hence does not terminate, until the sub-
ject matter of the trust has been properly distributed to the remainder-
men unless something to the contrary appears on the face of the instru-
3 411 Ill. 206, 103 N. E. (2d) 625 (1952).
4 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 1 et seq.
5 There might be some doubt as to the court's power to pass on the question on
direct appeal inasmuch as no freehold was involved: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch.
110, § 199(1).
8 In re Thomas' Will, 254 N. Y. 292, 172 N. E. 513 (1930).
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ment creating the trust.7 This period of time for the winding up of the
trust must, however, be no more than is reasonable considering the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, the size of the estate, and the marketa-
bility thereof8 for a trustee might be removed, or compelled to act, if
he delayed too long in the winding up process.
In the meantime, between termination date and complete distribution,
many issues could arise over the specific administrative powers possessed
by the trustee. Some courts have contented themselves with broad state-
ments of the type appearing in the case of In re Rothwel's Estate9 where
it was indicated that the trustee could perform any acts incidental to the
conservation of the trust property. These acts would, in all probability,
include such things as keeping the property insured, in a proper state of
repair, producing an income if possible, and seeing to it that all proper
taxes were paid, but the record is not clear. It is certain, however, that
when a trust terminates the trustee will have the primary duty to ac-
count and distribute. The manner in which this duty is to be carried
out, at least as to real property, will to some extent be dependent upon
the quantity of estate taken by the trustee at the time the trust was set up,
a factor to be determined from the intent of the settlor but commensurate
with the purposes to be effectuated by the trust.'0
If, for example, the settlor has provided for a remainder over after
the termination of an antecedent beneficial life estate, the trustee will
probably be held to have only a life estate so the title will vest in the
remaindermen. Where, however, the trustee has been given property in
fee simple, distribution may require the making of a conveyance from
the trustee to the remaindermen but the answer on this point varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In New York, for example, it has been held
that there will be no necessity for a conveyance as the title to the realty
would vest immediately in the remaindermen upon the termination of
the trust." Other jurisdictions have reached the same result by holding
that, upon termination, a trust becomes passive with the result that the
7 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Davis, 132 F. (2d) 644 (1943) ; Harlan v.
Gleason, 180 Md. 24, 22 A. (2d) 579 (1941) ; Harshbarger v. Harrison, 124 W. Va.
688, 22 S. E. (2d) 303 (1942).
8 Restatement, Trusts, Vol. 2, § 344.
9 283 Mass. 563, 186 N. E. 662 (1933).
10 See, for example, Lord v. Comstock, 240 Ill. 492, 88 N. E. 1012 (1909) ; Wright
v. Keasbey, 87 N. J. Eq. 51, 100 A. 172 (1917) ; Sequin State Bank & Trust Co. v.
Locke, 129 Tex. 524, 102 S. W. (2d) 1050 (1937).
11 In re Miller's Will, 257 N. Y. 349, 178 N. E. 555 (1931) ; Hutkoff v. Winmar
Realty Co., Inc., 211 App. Div. 726, 208 N. Y. S. 25 (1925) ; Cary v. Carman, 116
Misc. 463, 190 N. Y. S. 193 (1921) ; Watkins v. Reynolds, 123 N. Y. 211, 25 N. E.
322 (1890). This result is based on an interpretation given to New York Real
Property Law, § 109, which states: "When the purpose for which an express trust
is created ceases, the estate of the trustee shall also cease."
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
legal title vests in the remaindermen by virtue of the Statute of Uses. 12
In contrast, other states will require a conveyance from the trustee in
order to vest title in the remaindermen. The Illinois case of Kirkland v.
Cox l 3 will serve as an example of this view for it was there held that as
legal title had been vested in the trustee nothing short of a reconveyance
could divest him of that title. A later Illinois case, that of McFal v.
Kirkpatrick,14 supports this view by pointing out that, inasmuch as the
trust would not be executed until the trustee had conveyed to the re-
maindermen, the trust would remain active until that time, hence the
Statute of Uses would not apply. Even where title vests without a con-
veyance, such a conveyance has been deemed desirable in order to perfect
the record title, thereby making the property more readily disposable after
it is in the hands of the remainderman, 15 but such a conveyance will be
presumed to exist after a reasonable length of time in the interest of
protecting a purchaser from the beneficiary.' 6
Much the same diversity of opinion is evident where the corpus of
the trust includes, or consists of, personal property. New York, in the
case of In re Miller's Will,'7 unlike the holding with regard to realty, has
taken the position that the estate of the trustee in personal property will
continue after termination of the trust until division and distribution
takes place. While the Statute of Uses does not apply to personal prop-
erty, one author has indicated that there is no longer any reason for such
a distinction so, in the case of a passive trust in personal property, title
should vest in the beneficiary.' 8 This trend appears to be evidenced by
the Maryland case of Chapman v. Baltimore Trust Company'9 wherein
it was held that, upon the termination of a trust affecting personal prop-
erty, any power or authority granted to a trustee was at an end and the title
to such property had immediately become vested in the person last en-
titled to the beneficial use thereof.
Regardless of whether or not the trustee has title to the property after
termination, he will usually be in the possession thereof so will have a
12 Hinds v. Hinds, 126 Me. 521, 140 A. 189 (1928) ; Zuckman v. Freiermuth, 222
Minn. 172, 23 N. W. (2d) 541 (1946).
13 94 I1. 400 (1880).
14 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139 (1908). See also Emery v. Emery, 325 I. 212, 156
N. E. 364 (1927), and Lord v. Comstock, 240 Ill. 492, 88 N. E. 1012 (1909).
15 In re Rothwell's Estate, 283 Mass. 563, 186 N. E. 662 (1933).
16 Reilly v. Conrad, 9 Del. Ch. 154, 78 A. 1080 (1911).
17 257 N. Y. 349, 178 N. E. 555 (1931). See also Russell v. Bowers, 27 F. Supp. 13
(1931), wherein there is at least a strong Intimation that a trustee's estate in
personalty is not destroyed simply by the termination of the trust.
IS See Newman, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (Foundation Press, Inc., Brook-
lyn, 1949), p. 387. It is interesting to note that the author cites, among others, the
New York case of In re De Rycke's Will, 99 App. Div. 596, 91 N. Y. S. 159 (1904).
19 168 Md. 34, 177 A. 285 (1935).
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duty to divide and distribute the same among the remaindernien.20 . Whether
the corpus is real or personal property, the question will then arise as to
whether the distribution should be made in kind or whether the property
ought to be sold by the trustee and the proceeds divided. Again, general
rules purport to state that when the trust property is realty it should be
distributed in kind but, when it is personalty, it should be sold and the
proceeds divided.2 1 The exceptions to these rules are too numerous to
deal with extensively but it may be noted that, with respect to realty,
sales of the property are to be made where the settlor has expressed his in-
tent that such a sale should be made or where the property could not be
equally divided, 22 whereas, with respect to personalty, the mode of distribu-
tion should, more properly, be based upon the express or implied intention
of the settlor.23 Even so, the expressed intent of the settlor has been dis-
regarded where the nature of the property was such that, to follow his
direction, an inequality among the remaindermen would be produced 24
or where the remaindermen, provided they are sui juris, have agreed upon
a different mode of distribution.25 Doctrines with regard to equitable
conversion should not be overlooked for it may be noted that real estate
obtained through foreclosure of mortgage partakes of the nature of per-
sonal property and must be treated as such.26  Closely related to issues
apt to arise on distribution is the one concerning the trustee's power to
sell realty. Whether expressly given by the trust instrument or implied,
this power has been held to be exercisable, as noted above, in order to
20 In re Thomas' Will, 254 N. Y. 292, 172 N. E. 513 (1930).
21 See Scott, The Law of Trusts (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1939), Vol. 3,
§ 347.3, with regard to realty, and § 347.4, with regard to personalty.
22 Illustrative examples appear in Stoff v. McGuinn, 178 Ill. 46, 52 N. E. 1048
(1899); Helfrich v. Dandy, 160 Md. 338, 153 A. 57 (1931); Dodson v. Ashley, 101
Md. 513, 61 A. 299 (1905); Fox v. Merchant's Bank & Trust Co., 155 Miss. 188.
124 So. 321 (1929) ; Battenfeld v. Kline, 228 Pa. 91, 77 A. 416 (1910) ; Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Harris, 20 R. I. 160, 37 A. 701 (1897) ; and Saros v. Carlson,
244 Wis. 84, 11 N. W. (2d) 676 (1943). But see Poulter v. Poulter, 193 Ill. 641,
61 N. E. 1056 (1901). In Dreier v. Senger, 3 N. J. Misc. 769, 130 A. 5 (1925), the
court favored division rather than sale in the absence of a showing that the in-
equality in division could not be equalized by an extra allotment of personal
property.
23 The use of the word "divide" has been regarded as requiring a division and
distribution in kind: Gammon v. Gammon Theological Seminary, 153 Ill. 41, 38
N. E. 890 (1894). In Matter of Leeds, 154 Misc. 228, 276 N. Y. S. 950 (1935), the
court interpreted the word "pay" to call for a distribution in cash.
24 Waterman v. Alden, 115 Ii. 83, 3 N. E. 505 (1885), affirming 16 Ill. App. 586
(1885). The case was one in which the property consisted of numerous notes and
accounts of doubtful value. The court ordered an immediate sale in preference to
having the remaindermen run the risk that the property distributed to them in kind
might prove to be worthless at maturity.
25 Bergman v. Rhodes, 334 Ill. 137, 165 N. E. 598, 65 A. L. R. 344 (1929). The
settlor had directed the trustee to sell the realty and distribute the proceeds, but
the court indicated, provided all the remaindermen consented, they could compel a
distribution in kind.
26 In re Miller's Will, 257 N. Y. 349, 178 N. E. 555 (1931).
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make for an equitable distribution but the exercise thereof has also been
permitted, after termination and without regard to ownership, in order
to enable the trustee to reimburse himself for expenses incurred in the
administration of the trust.
2 7
There is very little primary authority concerning other specific powers
which a trustee might be entitled to exercise after the trust has termi-
nated. s A power of investment, for example, would almost without ques-
tion cease when the trust ends. 29 The power to lease realty would usually
also be limited to the term of the trust3 0 and, while there is no ironclad
rule on the point, one Illinois case indicates that a renewal option in favor
of the tenant would have to fall in the event the trustee's interest ceased
before the exercise thereof, especially where the testator had directed that
the realty was to be sold upon the death of the life beneficiaryY1 It is only
in New York, however, that courts have gone to the length of saying that
a trustee has no right to perform any act of administration with respect
to realty after the trust has terminated.32
It should be obvious that a clearer drafting of instruments used to
create trusts would help to alleviate some of the problems that can arise
at or upon termination. A trustee, however, is not forced to act at his
peril for, as the trust is a creature of equity, he may always seek the aid
of an equity court for the purpose of construing the instrument, reform-
ing it, if necessary, to carry out the settlor's intentions, to secure instruc-
tion as to his duties in the execution of the trust, or to enforce the
performance of those duties on all parties concerned. A prudent trustee,
then, in case of doubt or difficulty, would do well to seek the aid of an
equity court before he acts.
T. J. JOHNSTON
27 McNew v. Vert, 43 Ind. App. 83, 86 N. E. 969 (1909). The fact that the title to
the property has vested in the remaindermen is not inconsistent with the idea that
the trustee may also possess a power of sale exercisable after termination of the
trust: Schmidt v. Hinkley, 115 Md. 330, 80 A. 971 (1911); In re McLaughlin's
Estate, 193 Misc. 192, 82 N. Y. S. (2d) 784 (1948), affirmed in 275 App. Div. 659,
86 N. Y. S. (2d) 660 (1948).
28 A general discussion of the subject appears in Durand, "Powers of Trustees
upon Termination of Trusts," 45 Col. L. Rev. 865 (1945).
29 McBride v. McBride, 262 Ky. 452, 90 S. W. (2d) 736 (1936); Hodge v.
Mackintosh, 248 Mass. 181, 143 N. E. 43 (1924).
30 Grandy v. Robinson, 180 Ore. 315, 175 P. (2d) 463 (1946).
31 Hallin v. Hain, 2 Ill. App. (2d) 118, 118 N. E. (2d) 612 (1954).
32 In addition to the instant case, see In re McLaughlin's Estate, 193 Misc. 192,
82 N. Y. S. (2d) 784 (1948), affirmed in 275 App. Div. 659, 86 N. Y. S. (2d) 660
(1948) ; and In re Miller's Will, 257 N. Y. 349, 178 N. E. 555 (1931).
